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HARD BARGAINING ON BEHALF OF
THE GOVERNMENT TORTFEASOR:
A STUDY IN GOVERNMENTAL
LAWYER ETHICS
Steven K. Berensont
I. INTRODUCTION
During the first half of the 1990s, I worked as an assistant in the
Office of the Attorney General for the state of Massachusetts. My
initial assignment was to what became designated as the Administra-
tive Law Division within the office's Government Bureau.' In addi-
tion to representing state agencies in administrative appeals, lawyers
within the division represented state governmental entities in litiga-
tion challenging the validity of state statutes and regulations, as well
as in lawsuits challenging the legality of various government policies,
practices, and programs. 2 Although the work was interesting and chal-
lenging, it involved little actual trial practice. State agencies provided
their own legal representation in administrative hearings and in many
trial court proceedings. Thus, most of our representation of adminis-
trative agencies was in administrative appeals, which were conducted
based on the record compiled at the administrative hearing, 3 or in ac-
tual appeals of trial court decisions. The other cases we handled at the
trial court level usually involved pure questions of law, and were de-
cided on summary judgment.4
t Associate Professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author wishes to thank W.
Bradley Wendel and Fred Zacharias for comments on an earlier draft, and Deanna Sampson for
continuing support.
I The office of the Massachusetts Attorney General is divided into five Bureaus: Execu-
tive, Government, Criminal, Public Protection, and Business and Labor Protection. See Massa-
chusetts Attorney General: Office Overview, http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid--979
(last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
2 Id. (following the "Government Bureau" hyperlink).
3 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14(5) (West 2004).
4 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 56 (2002).
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Newer attorneys who wanted trial experience 5 had the option to
take on a case from the office's Trial Division.6 The Trial Division
defended cases against state governmental entities involving issues
other than governmental policies, practices, and programs. These
were primarily tort, contract, employment, real estate, and environ-
mental damage claims.7 As the name would imply, cases in the Trial
Division actually went to trial with much greater frequency than those
in the Administrative Law Division. Another salient difference be-
tween the cases assigned to the two divisions is the fact that by virtue
of the government's monopoly on certain types of activities (such as
lawmaking), most of the cases assigned to the Administrative Law
Division could only be brought against governmental entities, for ex-
ample, a suit challenging the constitutionality of an administrative
regulation. By contrast, many of the cases assigned to the Trial Divi-
sion could equally have been brought against a private defendant had
a private party engaged in the challenged conduct-for example, a
slip and fall case occurring on privately owned, rather than publicly
owned property. There might be procedural distinctions between the
private and public slip and fall cases as a result of the requirements
imposed by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA),8 but the
substance of the underlying claims would be virtually identical.
I volunteered to take on a Trial Division case and was assigned a
wrongful death claim involving a man in his early twenties, who died
at a state-run mental health facility.9 While the underlying facts in any
legitimate wrongful death action are disturbing, they were particularly
so in this case. At the time of his death, the decedent was involved in
his second inpatient mental health hospitalization, following a series
of unsuccessful suicide attempts and a lengthy period of treatment for
a variety of mental health issues including depression and bi-polar
disorder. The decedent's doctors were treating him with a number of
5 It has often been contended that one of the reasons why some newer attorneys choose
government over private law practice is the opportunity to get trial practice experience. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regu-
latory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1115-17 (1995); Michael Selmi, Public v. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401,
1445 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Department of Justice Litigation: Externalizing Costs and
Searching for Subsidies, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 173-75 (1998).
6 See Massachusetts Attorney General: Office Overview, supra note 1.
7 See id. (following the "Government Bureau" hyperlink).
8 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, §§ 1-13 (West 2004).
9 I do not currently possess any documents relating to the case, and my memory as to its
specific details is quite limited nearly a decade and a half later. However, the precise details are
not essential to the following analysis. The details that are provided represent my best recollec-
tion of the actual facts of the case.
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therapeutic approaches and a changing and complex "cocktail" of six
or seven different prescription drugs.
In the day or so before his death, the decedent began to display
symptoms of medical distress. These included an elevated tempera-
ture, sweating, a racing heartbeat (tachycardia), dryness of the mouth,
increased anxiety, and disorientation. These symptoms worsened until
emergency medical technicians were summoned to take the decedent
from the mental health facility to a hospital. This action, however,
was not sufficient to prevent the decedent's death a short time later.
Following an autopsy, the state's medical examiner established the
cause of death to be Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome (NMS). Ac-
cording to the National Institutes of Health's National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NMS is
a life-threatening neurological disorder most often caused by
an adverse reaction to neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs.
Symptoms include high fever, sweating, unstable blood pres-
sure, stupor, muscular rigidity, and autonomic dysfunction. In
most cases, the disorder develops within the first two weeks
of treatment with the drug; however, the disorder may de-
velop any time during the therapy period.10
Through research conducted after I was assigned the case, I
learned that NMS is quite rare and difficult to diagnose. 1 Thus, any
failure to diagnose and treat the disease may not have resulted from
substandard care on the part of the decedent's doctors.' 2 Such a de-
fense argument seemed objectively weak, however, given the dece-
dent's symptoms. Perhaps even more troubling from a legal defense
perspective was the response of the mental health facility's nursing
staff and doctors on call at the onset of the decedent's symptoms.
3
Although the medical records demonstrated that the nurses and doc-
tors involved were aware of and had monitored and attempted to treat
the decedent's symptoms, it was clear with hindsight that an earlier
transfer of the decedent to a hospital might have been advisable and
10 National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Neuroleptic Malignant Syn-
drome Information Page, http://www.ninds.gov/disorders/lneuroleptic-syndrome/lneuroleptic
syndrome.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
1 See, e.g., Stanley N. Caroff, Stephen C. Mann & E. Cabrina Campbell, Neuroleptic Ma-
lignant Syndrome, 209 ADVERSE DRUG REACTION BULL. 799 (2001); Anthony L. Pelerono,
James L. Levenson, & Anand K. Pandurangi, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome: A Review, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1163 (1998).
12 See Pelerono et al., supra note 11, at 1170-71.
13 See generally D. Thomas Blair & Alana Dauner, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome: Li-
ability in Nursing Practice, 31 J. OF PSYCHOSOCIAL NURSING AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
5,7-11 (1993).
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may have saved the decedent's life.' 4 Although the question of
whether the decedent's treatment in the last hours of his life fell be-
low the applicable standard of care would certainly be one for thejury; if the question went to a jury, a plaintiffs' verdict seemed highly
likely.
Litigation proceeded into discovery. As part of that process, I took
depositions of the decedent's parents, the plaintiffs in the lawsuit and
the decedent's only family. The parents were immigrants from Italy,
and (well into their sixties) were older than one might expect of the
parents of a man in his early twenties. Plaintiffs' counsel asserted that
the plaintiffs' English skills were not sufficient to conduct the deposi-
tion without a translator (though I suspect that counsel's insistence on
this approach was more of a tactic to limit the effectiveness of the
deposition than an expression of the plaintiffs' genuine need).
Not that the plaintiffs really needed anything beyond my own lack
of experience and discomfort with the foundations for the depositions(not to mention the defense as a whole) to limit the effectiveness of
that discovery tool. The plaintiffs knew almost nothing about the
medical treatment their son had received; therefore, their testimony
would have little relevance to the liability issues. But of course their
testimony would be highly relevant to the question of damages. Thus,
my objectives for the depositions were threefold: First, I wanted to
establish that the decedent's long history of mental health problems
and suicide attempts at least made it questionable whether the dece-
dent would have survived much further into adulthood, even in the
absence of any medical negligence that might have taken place. Sec-
ond, I wanted to document the decedent's limited education (he had
not graduated high school) and complete lack of work experience so
as to argue against any claim for lost earning capacity, which is often
the largest component of economic damages in a claim relating to the
death of a young person. Finally, I sought evidence that would un-
dermine any loss of consortium damages for the parents. With regard
to the last objective, information contained in the medical records
indicated a troubled relationship between parents and child, including
arguable verbal abuse of the decedent by the parents throughout his
upbringing, and likely physical abuse as well, in the form of excessive
use of corporal punishment.
Simply put, at the time I lacked the experience, skills, and imagi-
nation necessary to handle such delicate issues effectively in a deposi-
14 See generally Pelerono et al., supra note 11, at 1171-72 (citing Arthur Lazarus, Should
Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome Be Treated in a Private Psychiatric Hospital or a General
Hospital?, 12 GEN. HosP. PSYCHIATRY 245 (1990)).
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tion. The result was a few hours of tears (by the plaintiffs), misunder-
stood translations (by all parties), and little in the way of useful in-
formation (for the defense). The experience left me feeling worse than
I had before about the state's position.
The case went forward. At a routine scheduling conference with
the judge,15 the parties agreed to attend mediation. At the mediation
session, after the lawyers delivered both written and oral summaries
of their cases, the mediator agreed with the appraisal of both attor-
neys, namely, that this was a strong case for the plaintiffs, and a weak
one for the defendant. However, at this point in the discussion, the
most important fact from the perspective of settlement must be intro-
duced: under the MTCA, damages for negligence are capped at
$100,000.16 Although the jury in a MTCA case is not instructed as to
the damage cap during the trial, any jury award in excess of the cap is
reduced to $100,000. Thus, given the nature of the claim, what might
have been at least a seven figure case if brought against a private
party would be limited to the relatively small amount allowed under
the statute.
In light of the damage cap, the "expected value" I came up with
was $87,500.17 Although not based on a terribly elaborate analysis,
the way I came up with that figure was as follows: First, juries are
unpredictable. Therefore, I surmised that even the weakest case that
gets to the jury, such as my own, yields a 5-10 percent chance of a
verdict for the weaker side. Thus, the expected value of the case
dipped to $95,000-$90,000. 18 Next, subtracting at least a few thou-
sand dollars in litigation expenses (the plaintiffs would at a minimum
need to present the testimony of a medical expert), left me with the
$87,500 figure.
In perhaps another example of my new-lawyer naivet6, I relatively
quickly disclosed to the mediator my willingness to settle for up to
the $87,500 figure.' 9 Shortly thereafter, the mediation session turned
15 Here I learned another lesson in "zealous advocacy." I went to the scheduling confer-
ence with my date book (this was the early 1990s after all) and some suggestions for how to
wrap up discovery in the case. Plaintiffs' counsel, on the other hand, brought her opening argu-
ment and proceeded to deliver it as soon as we appeared before the judge. It was all uphill from
there for the defense, so to speak.
16 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 2004).
17 For a useful and thoughtful discussion of the manner in which attorneys "value" their
cases, see Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J.
DisP. RESOL. 1 (1991).
18 Ninety to ninety-five percent of $100,000.
I9 I did so with little doubt that the mediator would abide by the norm of confidentiality,
and not disclose my "bottom line" figure to opposing counsel without my consent. See, e.g.,
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS art. V (1994), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/modelstandardardsofconduct.doc. I also felt confident that the
well-qualified mediator would use the information appropriately to advance the parties' mutual
20051
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into a debate over the appropriateness of the $87,500 figure. Plain-
tiffs' counsel argued vigorously that because the case would clearly
have been worth far more than $100,000 if brought against a private
party, the state should simply pay the full amount allowed under the
damage cap, regardless of the "expected value" calculation articulated
in the previous paragraph. I stuck with my figure, which had been
approved up the chain of command within the Attorney General's
Office prior to the mediation. This was the "hard bargaining" referred
to in the title of this Article. For me, if the case did not settle, it sim-
ply meant I would receive the trial experience I sought in the first
place. However, from the plaintiffs' perspective, it certainly was not
worth the risk, time, and aggravation that they would incur in taking
the case to trial, for the possibility of at most a few thousand dollars
more (given the necessary costs of trial). After a good deal more blus-
ter, plaintiffs' counsel agreed to settle at $87,500.
In the intervening years, I have often thought about the appropri-
ateness of my actions in the litigation of the above described case,
which I shall refer to fictitiously for the remainder of this Article as
Alighieri v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Additionally, I have
published two articles focusing particularly on government attorney
ethics. In Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?,20 I argued in favor of
what I described as the "public-interest-serving-role" for government
attorneys, or, more particularly, the notion that government attorneys
have a greater duty to pursue the public interest than their counter-
parts in private practice.2' In The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations
that Follow from Civil Government Lawyers' General Duty to Serve
the Public Interest,22 I demonstrated that courts, legislators, and bar
authorities, have incorporated conceptions of the public-interest-
serving-role for civil government attorneys into the positive law (i.e.,
cases, statutes, and bar rules) in a variety of contexts. However, nei-
ther of those previous articles directly addressed the situation pre-
sented by Alighieri.
interest in a fair settlement. However, I have since come to learn that few practicing attorneys
would have such confidence in either proposition and that most practicing attorneys in fact keep
mediators "at arm's length" in much the same way they would approach the opposing party in abilateral negotiation to settle a case. See, e.g., John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: It's Use and
Abuse, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing "deceptions" routinely used by counsel and
mediators alike as part of the mediation process).
20 41 B.C. L. REv. 789 (2000) [hereinafter Berenson, Public Lawyers].
21 Id. at 789-90. For an explanation of what I mean by the term "private practice" in this
context, see Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations that Follow from Civil
Government Lawyers' General Duty To Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 13 n.l(2003) [hereinafter Berenson, The Duty Defined].
22 Berenson, The Duty Defined, supra note 21, at 13.
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More particularly, in Public Lawyers, after laying out traditional
understandings and formal statements of the public-interest-serving-
role,23 and identifying and responding to various critiques of that
role,24 I provided three examples of how the role should be applied in
particular government-lawyering contexts. The first example ad-
dressed the paradigmatic case of criminal prosecution.
25 The second
example involved work on behalf of a federal government agency in
setting up a program of aid to religious schools that raised serious
questions as to the program's constitutional and statutory validity.
26
The final example related to the role of attorneys in negotiating the
value to be paid for property in an eminent domain action.
27
In each of these three examples, the government client engaged in
conduct that only a government entity, as opposed to a private party,
could have engaged in. Of course, with regard to the first example,
only the government has the authority to pursue criminal prosecu-
tions. And with regard to the second example, only a government
agency could be authorized by legislation, and given access to public
funds to enact an education subsidy program. Similarly with regard to
the third example, only the government, or an entity acting with a
grant of government authority, can exercise the power of eminent
domain.
Virtually all of the examples of positive law discussed in The Duty
Defined also involved government clients or government entities en-
gaged in conduct that no private client or entity would be able to en-
gage in. In each of these examples, at least to a certain degree, it is the
government actor's exercise of sovereignty that justifies imposing
special or "higher" duties than would be applied to the lawyer for a
private party who cannot exercise such sovereignty. 2
8 However, as
suggested above, in many contexts, government entities appear to act
without exercising the sovereign authority accorded to them. In such
contexts, a government entity's actions do not appear to be fundamen-
tally different from similar actions of a private party. For example, if
a government agency purchases automobiles for its employees, its
23 Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 792-802.
24 Id. at 802-35.
25 Id. at 835-40. More particularly, the article evaluated the actions of federal prosecutors
in seeking to disqualify defense counsel in the case of Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153
(1988).
26 Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 840-44. The example was taken from
Geoffrey Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1293 (1987).
27 Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 840-44. The example was taken from Jack
B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 18 ME. L. REv.
155, 169 (1966). See Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 844-45.
28 See infra Part V.
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actions might not appear to be significantly different from those of a
corporation making such a purchase. Or, if the driver of one of those
government automobiles gets in a fender bender with a private citi-
zen, the government might be faced with a tort suit in which its ac-
tions might also be viewed as equivalent to those of a private party
defending a similar suit.
Indeed, the Alighieri case might well be characterized as one in
which the government defendant's actions do not appear to be signifi-
cantly different from those that might be engaged in by a private
party. After all, doctors and their support staff who work for private
hospitals or other private health care entities are sued for medical
malpractice and/or wrongful death with some frequency. In such cir-
cumstances, it might well be argued that because the government's
conduct did not differ significantly from conduct a private party
might have engaged in, the ethical responsibilities imposed on the
government's lawyers should similarly not differ from those imposed
on the lawyers for the private party, as would be the case if the gov-
ernment defendant had engaged in a sovereign government function,
that is, one that a private party could not engage in.
Thus, one of the primary purposes of this Article is to try to deter-
mine whether the public-interest-serving-role, as identified in the
above-mentioned articles, applies equally in contexts where the gov-
ernment lawyer represents a government entity engaged in conduct
that does not appear to involve an exercise of the entity's sovereignty.
A second important purpose is to then determine, if there is such an
exception to the applicability of the public-interest-serving-role,
whether that exception applies in the circumstances of the case de-
scribed herein.
Before addressing these fundamental questions, however, this
Article explores whether my conduct in Alighieri violated relevant
ethical standards that would apply to an attorney engaging in similar
activity but working for a private party.29 According to the public-
interest-serving-role, if the same conduct engaged in by a government
attorney would be deemed unethical if engaged in by a private
attorney, then by definition, the government attorney's conduct would
be unethical. To determine how the actions of a private attorney who
engaged in the same behavior that I did in Alighieri would be viewed
from an ethical perspective, it is necessary to explore two familiar
categories of legal ethics principles, namely, the duty not to pursue or
29 See infra Part I.
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defend a claim on grounds that are frivolous, 30 and the collection of
rules and norms that govern attorney settlement negotiations.
3
'
After concluding that my actions in Alighieri would not have been
unethical if engaged in by an attorney for a private party, this Article
then considers whether, under established doctrine, the answer should
be different given that a government attorney did in fact engage in the
actions on behalf of a government entity. 32 More particularly, in The
Duty Defined, I argued that existing doctrine supports the notion that
a higher threshold of "nonfrivolity" applies to government attorney
decisions to bring or defend a claim than applies to private practitio-
ners.33 I also argued that courts exhibit a lower tolerance for certain
"hardball litigation tactics" when engaged in by government attorneys
than they would for similar conduct engaged in by private attorneys.34
Thus, this Article next reviews my conduct in Alighieri through the
lens of the heightened pleading threshold applicable to government
attorneys 35 and the more constrained version of zealous representation
available to government attorneys.3 6 At least with regard to the former
issue, the Article concludes that a serious question is raised as to
whether the defense in this case was appropriate in light of the appli-
cable standard for government attorneys.
Assuming for the sake of discussion that my conduct in Alighieri
did not run afoul of the doctrines mentioned in the previous para-
graph, this Article next applies the general approach to the public-
interest-serving-role identified in Public Lawyers to the facts of the
instant case.37 To do so, it is necessary to discuss in some detail the
purposes behind damage caps such as the one included in the
MTCA.38 After engaging in this analysis, this Article also concludes
that a serious question is raised as to the appropriateness of my set-
tlement posture in light of the purposes behind the MTCA damage
cap.
Given the conclusion that my conduct in Alighieri raised serious
issues as to its appropriateness under the public-interest-serving-role,
this Article next returns to the fundamental question of whether an
exception to the public-interest-serving-role should apply to situations
in which the government attorney represents a government entity act-
3 See infra Part I.A.
31 See infra Part H.B.
32 See infra Part 1II.
33 See Berenson, The Duty Defined, supra note 21, at 23-28.
34 Id. at 29-31 (citing other secondary sources).
35 See infra Part 1II.A.
36 See infra Part II.B.
37 See infra Part IV.
38 See infra Part IV.
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ing in a capacity that does not appear to exercise the entity's sover-
eign authority. 39 To answer this question, the link between sover-
eignty and the public-interest-serving-role is explored.40 Additionally,
an analogy is drawn to substantive law doctrines in which the U.S.
Supreme Court has treated government actors differently in situations
where the actors allegedly have not exercised their sovereign author-
ity, from how the Court would have treated the actors had they exer-
cised such authority.4 ' More specifically, this Article explores the
"market participant" exception to application of the dormant com-
merce clause, the possible First Amendment exception that applies to
the government in its role as speaker as opposed to regulator of
speech, and the similar exception to First Amendment constraints that
42applies to the government in its capacity as an employer. Although
parallels between these doctrines and Alighieri exist, this Article con-
cludes that these doctrines are either seriously flawed or are limited to
the point that even if accepted in their current forms, they do not go
so far as to conclude that the government actors in those situations
completely "shed" their sovereignty and therefore should be treated
exactly the same as similarly situated private entities. Thus, the notion
that government attorneys can ever escape completely from the stric-
tures of the public-interest-serving-role is rejected.
Moreover, even if it were that case that in certain circumstances
government attorneys should be exempt from the public-interest-
serving-role because neither they nor their clients' conduct differed
significantly from that which a private attorney and/or his or her pri-
vate party client might engage in, it would be questionable whether
the case discussed here would fall within such an exception. Thus,
this Article next goes on to examine whether Alighieri would qualify
for any exemption to the public-interest-serving-role for government
attorneys.43
After concluding that it would not, this Article ultimately con-
cludes by reiterating its appraisal of the conduct in question pursuant
to the public-interest-serving-role. 44
II. PRIVATE ATTORNEY ETHICS
Before turning to whether my conduct in Alighieri violated the
ethical standards applicable to government attorneys, it is worth ask-
39 See infra Part V.
40 See infra Part V.
41 See infra Part V.A.
42 See infra Part V.A.
43 See infra Part V.B.
4 See infra Part VI.
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ing whether similar conduct would be unethical if engaged in by an
attorney for a private party. Because the public-interest-serving-role
imposes additional duties on government attorneys beyond those ap-
plicable to private practitioners, it is necessarily the case that if con-
duct engaged in by a government lawyer would violate standards ap-
plicable to private attorneys, then such conduct would be unethical
when engaged in by the government attorney as well. In general, at-
torneys for private parties are expected to work diligently to pursue
their clients' lawful objectives. 45 And it is clear that for a client's ob-
jectives to be lawful, the pursuit of the objectives must involve nei-
ther a violation of substantive law by attorney or client46 nor a viola-
tion of relevant legal ethics standards.47
45 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.3 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000). The long standing formulation was "[z]ealous
[advocacy] [w]ithin the [b]ounds of the [liaw." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon
7 (1969). However, when the American Bar Association replaced its Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility with its Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, the Canonical
status of the duty of zealous advocacy was reduced to a couple of mentions in the Rules' Pre-
amble. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. 9 2, 7 (1983). And, in the more
recent Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, zealous advocacy barely warrants a
mention in the comment to the section entitled "A Lawyer's Duties to a Client-In General,"
and does so by way of disclaimer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERS § 16 cmt. d (2000). The comment states that as a matter of law, any suggested duty of
zealous advocacy amounts to nothing more than an attorney's combined other duties of compe-
tence and diligence. Id. Other commentators have devoted much attention to the meaning of the
decreased focus on zealous advocacy in each subsequent codification of attorney professional
responsibility. See, e.g., John Conlon, It's Time To Get Rid of the "Z" Word, 44 RES GESTAE 50
(2001) (discussing the historical development of the zealous advocacy standard and its applica-
bility to the present); W. William Hodes, We Need More Zealousness, Not Less-But Within the
Bounds of the Law, 44 RES GESTAE 46 (2001) (discussing the zealotry-zealousness distinction
in support of a properly defined zealous advocacy standard); Janis Reinken, Zealous Represen-
tation: No-Win Benchmark for Lawyers, 65 TEX. B.J. 706 (2002) (discussing the subjectivity of
the zealous advocacy ideal). However, this debate is largely beside the point for the present
discussion. It is clear that the language in the above-cited provisions relating to the degree of
effort required to be expended by a lawyer acting on behalf of a client represents a minimum
standard that must be satisfied by the lawyer, rather than an upper limit. Indeed, to the extent
such an upper limit exists, it is embodied in other, more specific prohibitions---the "bounds of
the law" aspect of the above-cited formulations. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
Here, there is no reasonable argument my efforts on behalf of the government defendant fell
below the level of zeal required of a government attorney. Rather, as is discussed in more detail
below, any reasonable argument relating to zealousness in the instant case would be that my
conduct on behalf of the government defendant transgressed the upper, rather than the lower
limit, of required effort on the part of a government attorney.
46 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2000) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in the conduct that the lawyer knows to be criminal or fraudu-
lent .... ); see also David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 471
& n.9 (1990) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1,7-4,7-5 (1980)).
47 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUT 1 .1 6(a)(1) (2002) ("[A] lawyer shall not repre-
sent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if ... the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or
other law ...."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 ("[Tihe bounds of the
law ... includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations."); see also Wil-
kins, supra note 46, at 471 & n.10 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1
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There is nothing even remotely unlawful about a defense attorney
in a tort suit seeking to minimize the amount the plaintiff recovers
from her or his client, if that is the client's objective. Indeed, the deci-
sion whether, or for how much, to settle a lawsuit falls within the cli-
ent's exclusive authority in terms of the delegation of authority be-
tween lawyer and client within the scope of the professional
48relationship. However, my conduct in Alighieri does raise questions
with regard to at least two attorney ethical obligations. The first in-
volves the attorney's duty not to defend a claim unless there is a non-
frivolous basis for doing SO. 4 9 The second involves the collection of
rules and norms that govern attorney conduct in negotiating settle-
ments. 50 Below, it is determined whether my conduct in Alighieri, if
engaged in by an attorney for a private party, would have violated
either of those obligations.
A. Frivolous Defense
According to the best-known formulation of the nonfrivolity re-
quirement as applied to private attorneys, "[a] lawyer shall not...
defend a proceeding ... or controvert an issue therein, unless there is
a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.",51 The evi-
dence of medical negligence in Alighieri was strong enough at least to
raise a question as to whether defense of the claim would have been
frivolous if engaged in by an attorney for a private hospital, physi-
cian, or medical insurer. Of course, the term "frivolous" is not self-
defining in the context of litigation defense, and the Model Rules also
fail to provide a definition of the term.52 The Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers (the "Restatement"), which contains
similar language to that in Model Rule 3.1, goes further in defining a
frivolous position in litigation as "one that a lawyer of ordinary com-
petence would recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no sub-
stantial possibility that the tribunal would accept it."53
(1980)).
48 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.2(a) (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 (2000).
49 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.1 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (2000).
50 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 (2000). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's
Obligation To Be Trustworthy when Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181(1981); Gary T. Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure To Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotia-
tion, 35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975).
51 MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003).
52 Id.
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (2000).
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However, even application of the Restatement's standard raises
questions in the medical malpractice context. That is because the ul-
timate question of whether there was medical negligence is generally
one for the jury rather than the judge.54 Related principles that are
relevant to the instant case are that generally the question of whether
there was medical negligence requires expert testimony, 55 and that by
definition if there is a conflict between experts regarding the question
of negligence, the case is properly submitted to the jury.56 Another
way to put this is that a court may not take the question of medical
negligence away from the jury by granting summary judgment, for
example, as long as there is credible expert testimony on both sides of
the question.57
Applying the above-described principles to the facts of Alighieri
yields the conclusion that a private attorney would not have acted un-
ethically in defending a medical malpractice claim under the same
circumstances. Early on in my investigation of the case, I was di-
rected to a Department of Mental Health psychiatrist, who was not
involved in Alighieri, but had reviewed the case pursuant to internal
department procedures, following the decedent's death but prior to
the filing of the lawsuit. This doctor was experienced, had strong pa-
per credentials, and disagreed with the medical examiner's conclusion
that the cause of death was NMS. Correspondingly, the doctor did not
believe that the department's doctors and staff had acted negligently
in failing to treat the decent for NMS.
Of course, one can debate how much credence a jury would have
placed on this one expert's views. Although he was thoughtful,
articulate, and would have presented himself well to the jury, the fact
that he was a department insider might have raised a presumption of
bias. On the other hand, there was absolutely no reason to believe that
the doctor had been pressured to reach his conclusions nor was there
any evidence to suggest that his employment would have been
negatively impacted had he concluded for internal purposes that there
had been medical negligence. Indeed, the fact that the doctor would
not be compensated beyond his normal salary for his testimony could
counter any perceived bias, at least when contrasted with the
5 See, e.g., Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 218-19 (D.C. 2005); Breeden v. Anesthesia
West, P.C., 656 N.W.2d 913,921 (Neb. 2003).
55 Burke, 867 A.2d at 219; Garnett v. Coyle, 33 P.3d 114, 122 (Wyo. 2001).
56 Burke, 867 A.2d at 218-19; Barresi v. Sou-Maw Chow, 740 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002).
57 Burke, 867 A.2d at 218-19; Barresi, 740 N.Y.S. at 446; see also Garnett, 33 P.3d at 122
(finding summary judgment for defendant appropriate where plaintiff failed to present expert
testimony of medical negligence); David Hittner, Summary Judgments in Texas, 35 BAYLOR L.
REV. 207,221 (1983).
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plaintiffs' expert, who most certainly would be paid for her or his
testimony. 58
In any event, the conflicting expert testimony would have made it
clear that no reasonable tribunal could have rejected the defense pre-
sented as frivolous. Furthermore, a jury decision to believe the de-
fense expert rather than any plaintiffs' experts would not properly
have been rejected as unreasonable. 59 In such circumstances, the non-
frivolity standard articulated above would certainly be satisfied by a
private attorney presenting a defense based on the testimony of the
above-described expert witness.
B. Negotiation Ethics
Another question that should be addressed is whether the negotia-
tion approach taken in this case would have been unethical if engaged
in by an attorney for a private party. Earlier, reference was made to
the collection of rules and norms that govern attorney conduct in ne-
gotiation of settlements in litigation. 60 Discussing the applicable stan-
dards in such broad terms is necessary in the area of negotiation be-
cause, in fact, there is a paucity of binding rules that govern attorney
conduct in negotiation. 6' Perhaps this is the case because there is such
wide normative disagreement regarding what the appropriate ethical
standards for negotiations ought to be.62 Or this state of affairs may
exist because so much negotiation takes place outside the public view,
thus rendering enforcement of binding rules of conduct in this area
difficult.
63
In any event, the starting (and often ending) point for discussions
of negotiation ethics is generally Model Rule 4.1,64 which prohibits
lawyers from making false statements of material fact in the course of
representing a client.65 However, it should be obvious that no mis-
51 See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Per-
ceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109,1126 & n.51 (1997).
59 See, e.g., DeVoogt v. Hobbs, 593 S.E.2d 868, 873-74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Halowell v.
Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 777 N.E.2d 435, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Hutchison v. Pharris, 158 S.W.3d
554, 567-68 (Tex. App. 2005).
60 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Cooley, supra note 19, at 94.
62 Id. at 95-97 & nn.649-63 (summarizing various scholarly positions regarding negotia-
tion ethics).
63 RICHARD A ZrrRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
446 (2d ed. 2001).
64 Cooley, supra note 19, at 94.
65 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 (2000); see also MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
8.4(c) (2003) (precluding lawyers from engaging "in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation"). However, this provision has not been interpreted to impose obliga-
tions on lawyers relating to negotiation beyond those imposed by Rule 4.1. Cooley, supra note
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statement of fact was made in Alighieri. To the contrary, as suggested
above,66 my fear in retrospect is that I was too candid in revealing my
"bottom line" for settling the case, not that I acted deceptively in dis-
guising the defendant's willingness to settle. Moreover, even if I had
lied about what the defendant was willing to settle for, the comments
to Rule 4.1 specifically except statements as to a party's intentions
regarding settlement from the category of statements of material fact
covered by the rule.67
Perhaps if my conduct in Alighieri had been engaged in by an
attorney for a private party, it may have been unethical to go into the
mediation session in the first place with a firm "bottom line" and an
unwillingness to settle for any figure above that amount. However,
rules of ethics governing attorneys representing parties in mediation
are even less well established than those governing representation in
68bilateral settlement negotiations. While there may be an emerging
standard of "good faith" that applies to attorney conduct in
mediation, 69 it must be kept in mind that Alighieri was litigated nearly
a decade and a half ago when any such standard would have been in
its infancy. Moreover, participation in the mediation session in
Alighieri was purely voluntary-there was no requirement to attend
mediation at the time. Furthermore, even to the extent that a good
faith requirement might have applied, such a requirement has not
been interpreted to condemn attorney insistence that settlement be at a
particular figure unless such a figure is wholly unreasonable.7 ° While
the reasoning process described above that went into developing the
settlement figure in Alighieri may not have been the most
sophisticated one possible, it certainly should not be characterized as
unreasonable. Indeed, the fact that the plaintiffs ultimately accepted
the settlement offer belies any argument that the offer was so
unreasonable as to represent bad faith. Thus, had a private attorney
engaged in conduct analogous to my own, he or she would not have
violated applicable ethical standards.
19, at 98-99.
66 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2003); accord RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. c (2000); Cooley, supra note 19, at 97.
m Cooley, supra note 19, at 101.
69 See, e.g., John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods To Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 78-86 (2002)
(reviewing statutes, rules, and court decisions that establish good-faith requirements in media-
tion).
70 Id. at 92; see also John Lande, Why a Good-Faith Requirement Is a Bad Idea for Me-
diation, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 1, 9 (2005) (quoting ABA Sec-
tion of Dispute Resolution).
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III. GOVERNMENT ATT7ORNEY ETHICS-THE POSITIVE LAW
Since my conduct in Alighieri would not have been unethical if it
had been engaged in by a private attorney, the question now is
whether that same conduct would have been inappropriate given that
it was engaged in by a government attorney. The next section of the
Article addresses the question of whether it would be appropriate for
a government lawyer to pursue the lowest possible recovery for the
plaintiff suing a government entity if that were the objective of the
government client.7' More narrowly for the moment, however, in The
Duty Defined, I contended that in a number of areas, courts, legisla-
tures, and bar authorities are developing different ethical standards
applicable to government attorney activities than are applicable to
private attorneys.72 Two of these areas relate to the two ethical issues
addressed in the private representation context in Part H: frivolous
defense and negotiation ethics. More particularly, a higher threshold
for defending claims may apply to government attorneys than applies
to private practitioners,73 and courts may have a lower tolerance for
certain hardball litigation tactics when engaged in by government at-
torneys than when engaged in by private attorneys. 74 Thus, the ques-
tions of frivolous defense and negotiation ethics must be revisited
under the emerging standards that apply to government attorneys.
A. Frivolous Defense
Although courts do appear to apply a higher standard for bringing
or defending a claim to government attorneys, a single, clearly articu-
lated alternative to the nonfrivolity standard that applies to attorneys
for private parties has yet to emerge. Two possible formulations that I
have cited to previously come from Judge Jack Weinstein's opinion
in Zimmerman v. Schweiker.75 One, described as the "reasonable liti-
gation-attorney" standard, asks: "Is there any substantial chance of
success for my client? Am I merely going through the motions of a
suit when my investigation of the law and facts convinces me that my
71 See infra Part IV.
72 See Berenson, The Duty Defined, supra note 21, at 13.
73 Id. at 23.
74 Id. at 29.
75 575 F. Supp. 1436 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Zimmerman involved a request for attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. 1111982), after
the plaintiff successfully overturned a decision by the United States Secretary of Health and
Human Services denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.
Under the EAJA, a prevailing party in a case against the United States is entitled to attorneys'
fees if the government's position in the litigation was not "substantially justified." Id. at 1438.
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client would and should lose? '76 The other, addressed even more di-
rectly to government defense attorneys asks: "Is opposing this claim
just, is it fair, is there a reasonable basis for believing that the gov-
ernment can prevail on both the law and facts?
77
Although those standards are not self-executing, each raises a seri-
ous question as to the appropriateness of the defense in Alighieri. In
my heart, I believed both that my client and I would lose, and indeed
should lose, were the case to be tried. Thus, under neither standard
would it have been appropriate to require the plaintiffs to try the case.
However, this I did not do. In agreeing to settle the case, I may have
done all that the above two standards required. On the other hand, I
was willing to go to trial should the plaintiffs refuse to agree to my
firm settlement offer, and indeed it may only have been that credible
"threat" that caused the plaintiffs to settle. Thus, a proper application
of the above two standards might well have required settlement for
the full amount of the damage cap. Perhaps a final conclusion with
regard to this question must await the fuller discussion of the purpose
behind the damage cap that will be undertaken later in this Article.78
Moreover, because interesting issues related to the case remain to be
addressed, I will assume for purposes of discussion that my conduct
in Alighieri did not run afoul of the higher standard for defense of a
claim that applies to government attorneys. However, a reasonable
application of such a standard might indeed conclude that my conduct
as a government attorney was unethical.
B. Hardball Litigation Tactics
In addition to a higher pleading threshold, courts have begun to
exhibit a lower tolerance for certain hardball litigation tactics when
engaged in by government attorneys than when similar tactics are en-
gaged in by attorneys for private parties. 79 Thus, the question might
be asked whether the firm negotiating stance taken in Alighieri might
run afoul of such a standard. However, given the above analysis of
the negotiating stance taken in Alighieri from the perspective of pri-
vate practice ethics, 80 it may not even be accurate to describe the ne-
gotiating tactics applied here as "hardball," let alone impermissible.
76 Zimmerman, 575 F. Supp. at 1439. Subsequent courts have adopted this standard for
purposes of application of the EAJA. See Mager v. Heckler, 621 F. Supp. 1009, 1010 (D. Colo.
1985); Blanchette v. Heckler, 586 F. Supp. 903, 904 (D. Colo. 1984); Trujillo v. Heckler, 582 F.
Supp. 701, 704 (D. Colo. 1984).
77 Zimmerman, 575 F. Supp. at 1440.
78 See infra p. 370.
79 See Berenson, The Duty Defined, supra note 21, at 29.
80 See supra Part 11.
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Certainly, none of the specific tactics that have been deemed to be
inappropriate when engaged in by government attorneys resemble the
hard bargaining I engaged in.81 Thus, without delving into the ques-
tion in much detail, it can be concluded that my negotiating tactics did
not violate emerging standards prescribing certain hardball litigation
tactics on the part of government attorneys.
IV. THE PUBLIC-INTEREST-SERVING-ROLE
FOR GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
Assuming, for purposes of discussion that my conduct in Alighieri
did not violate positive law relating to the conduct of government
attorneys, the next question is whether that conduct nonetheless may
have violated a broader conception of appropriate conduct by
government lawyers. Is it appropriate for a government lawyer
defending a tort claim to seek the lowest possible recovery for the
plaintiff? Note that with regard to the same question asked in relation
to conduct by a private lawyer, the conclusion was that such conduct
would be appropriate because: (1) seeking to minimize recovery is a
lawful objective of the client and (2) such an objective is reserved
exclusively to the client in terms of the scope of authority within the
lawyer client relationship.82 Referring to the second point first,
perhaps the "800 pound gorilla in the room" that has yet to be
addressed is: as a government attorney, who was my client? Indeed,
many commentators who have addressed questions of government
attorney ethics have viewed as the necessary starting point the
determination of who the client of the government lawyer is. 83
However, I (along with others) have argued that answering the "who
is the client" question is often neither necessary, nor even particularly
helpful, in determining a government attorney's ethical obligations in
84a particular set of circumstances.
For example, in Alighieri, there are numerous possible answers to
the "who is the client" question. In the litigation itself, pursuant to the
81 See Berenson, The Duty Defined, supra note 21, at 29.
82 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Con-flicts of Interest in Representation of Public Agencies in Civil Matters, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L.,
211, 219-22 (2000); James Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of
Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1996); Joshua
Panas, Note, The Miguel Estrada Confirmation Hearings and the Client of a Government Law-
yer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 541, 542 (2004).
84 See Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 797-800; see also Robert P. Lowry,
Who Is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer?: An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37
FED. B.J. 61 (1978); Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Law-
yers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1180-82 (2002).
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requirements of the MTCA, the only properly named defendant was
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 85 But if the commonwealth is
treated as "the client," the basic issue that plagues all entity represen-
tations arises-which individuals have the authority to give instruc-
tions to the lawyer on behalf of the entity client? When the entity is a
state, perhaps the governor as the state's chief executive officer has
that authority. However, it seems quite silly to think that I might have
sought direction from the governor of Massachusetts, or anyone on
his legal staff for that matter. Other authorities have contended that
the branch of government implicated in the dispute is the client, in
this case, the executive.86 However, this "answer" does not solve the
fundamental entity representation problem. Nor is the problem solved
by treating the client as the executive branch agency employing the
hospital, doctors, and support staff that allegedly treated the decedent
negligently, namely, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.
Thus, another possible client or client spokesperson might be the
relevant agency head, or perhaps the agency's general counsel. How-
ever, neither of these persons had any knowledge regarding the facts
of Alighieri. Perhaps then the client should be the subordinate agency
personnel (both inside and outside the general counsel's office), who
actually had knowledge of the facts relevant to Alighieri, and who I
actually dealt with in formulating a defense in the case. Of course,
none of these individuals were named defendants, nor would they
personally be liable to pay any part of the judgment or settlement.
Indeed, under Massachusetts law at the time, all judgments and set-
tlements of litigation claims were paid out of the state's general fund
rather than the involved agency's budget, thereby even further limit-
ing the stake of individual agency personnel in the outcome of the
lawsuit. Moreover, no theory of bureaucratic accountability within a
democratic state would accord the full authority that goes with client
status to personnel so far down the agency "chain of command.,
87
The situation is further complicated here by the fact that in Massa-
chusetts, the attorney general is an independently elected, constitu-
tionally recognized officer with individual authority over the conduct
of litigation instituted on behalf of, or against, the commonwealth.88
Thus, the attorney general had an independent responsibility for the
15 See MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 2004).
86 See William H. Simon, The Professional Responsibilities of the Public Official's Law-
yer: A Case Study from the Clinton Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 999, 1009 & n.54 (2002)
(citing to cases treating the government lawyer's client as the executive branch for purposes of
determining applicability of attorney-client privilege).
87 See Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 822-24.
88 See, e.g., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 1977); Sec'y of
Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 326 N.E.2d 334 (Mass. 1975).
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reasonableness of the settlement posture taken in Alighieri. Therefore,
the attorney general also might properly be viewed as the client in this
situation, or perhaps the head of the office's Trial Division, or even
other supervisory attorneys within the division. In fact, it was the lat-
ter persons whom I dealt with almost exclusively in formulating the
actual settlement posture in the case.
Alternatively, arguments have been made that the public, or the
public interest, should be treated as the client in the representation of
government entities. 89 Obviously, treating every citizen of Massachu-
setts as a client of the government lawyer would be unworkable and
unwise,90 though I have argued that public opinion should not be dis-
counted entirely in determining appropriate government lawyer con-
duct.9' The version of the public-interest-serving-role I have advo-
cated for also rejects the idea that any abstract notion of "the public
interest," particularly when that term serves as a euphemism for a par-
ticular government lawyer's personal policy preferences, should be
treated as the government attorney's client.92 However, through
proper analysis of the relevant legal source material, the next Section
of this Article demonstrates that rather than pursuing such an amor-
phous and overarching concept of the public interest, government at-
torneys can, and indeed should, determine how the public interest is
implicated in the context of the particular legal disputes they are
called upon to help resolve.
93
In any event, the above discussion underscores the fact that choos-
ing a single client from among the many possibilities mentioned
above would be arbitrary and could serve to prevent the significant
contribution that might be made by other potential clients on the list
to determine the proper approach to take in litigating the case. There-
fore, the version of the public-interest-serving-role advocated here
suggests that the correct approach of the government attorney to liti-
gating this case would be to seek guidance from a wide range of the
sources identified above and to serve a mediating function in consid-
ering how to incorporate those views in the representation. Of course,
such a task would be very difficult if the views of all of the potential
clients were at odds in a given case. However, in the instant case, as
will be true in many cases, most if not all of the potential clients
89 Cramton, supra note 83, at 298.
90 See Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 506 n.5 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting plaintiff's
claim that as a member of the public, she was a client of the City Attorney, and therefore enti-
tled to waive any claim of privilege relating to communications between the City Attorney and
the City Council).
91 See Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 818-19.
92 Id. at 846.
93 See infra Part V; see also Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 814-21.
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shared common interests in the litigation of the matter. For example,
all of these parties share an interest in both minimizing the impact of
a judgment or settlement in the case on the public fisc and in assuring
that the plaintiffs received fair treatment in the process of litigating
their claim against the government.
One thing that should be clear from the foregoing discussion is that
in Alighieri, I played a much greater role in formulating its settlement
posture than a similarly situated private attorney would have in advo-
cating the settlement figure proposed by his or her private client pur-
suant to the client's exclusive authority regarding settlement.94 This
will often be the case to a greater or lesser degree in government legal
practice. Therefore, in contrast to the situation with the private attor-
ney, the ethical appropriateness of the government attorney's conduct
must be evaluated in conjunction with an evaluation of the appropri-
ateness of the substance of the commonwealth's settlement posture in
light of the relevant legal authorities.
This returns us to the first issue raised at the beginning of this Part:
how appropriate is the objective of minimizing plaintiff recovery in a
tort case against a government defendant?95 To answer this question,
focus is placed on the writings of Professor William H. Simon regard-
ing appropriate ethical behavior for attorneys generally, which in turn
were relied on heavily in developing the version of the public-
interest-serving-role for government attorneys advocated in Public
Lawyers, Private Values.96 Simon's basic maxim for lawyers' ethics
is that lawyers "should take such actions as, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote jus-
tice."97 Given that one of the starting points for Simon's theory was
the duty of government prosecutors to "seek justice" rather than
merely to convict defendants,98 and that the prosecutor's duty to seek
justice, in turn, is grounded in the same conception of government
sovereignty that grounds the broader public-interest-serving-role for
all government attorneys, 99 it makes sense to look to Simon's theory
in formulating a conception of the public-interest-serving-role for
government attomeys.100
94 See supra pp. 362-65.
95 See supra p. 362.
96 Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 817-18.
97 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 9
(1998) [hereinafter SIMON, THE PRACTICE].
98 Id. at 10; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1091 (1988).
99 See infra Part V.
'0 Another reason to look to Simon's theory as a basis for developing a proper conception
of government attorney ethics is its origin in opposition to traditional approaches to legal ethics
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The breadth of the term "justice," in Simon's maxim, as well as in
the justice-seeking role for public prosecutors, and similar concep-
tions of "the public interest" in the public-interest-serving-role for
government attorneys generally, has caused some critics to contend
that application of these standards in particular cases is likely to be
hopelessly indeterminate.'10 However, for purposes of his maxim,
whose primary justifications lie in the "private" values of individual dignity and autonomy.
Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 811-13. Simon's grounding of his ethical theory in
the "public" values of justice and legal merit makes it a more appropriate candidate for ground-
ing a view of attorney ethics that will apply in the public realm of government legal practice
than the traditional approaches. See id. at 830-35 (discussing how private values are an inappro-
priate basis for evaluating public lawyers' conduct). However, since the writing of Public Law-
yers, at least a couple of scholars have offered critiques or responses to the theories of Simon
and like-minded scholars, who seek a return to the more client-centered approach advocated by
traditional views of legal ethics, in contrast to the approach offered by Simon, which vests
greater discretion with lawyers to determine appropriate actions in the course of legal represen-
tation. Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of
View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 45, 73-77 (2004) (citing Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting
Professional Identity, 74 CoLo. L. REV. 1 (2003); W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004)). A difference between these critiques and traditional justifications
of client-centered lawyering is that the new critiques are largely based on public values, rather
than the private values of individual dignity or autonomy. See Spaulding, supra (grounding
advocacy of a client-centered approach in public values including public service and broad
access to legal services); Wendel, supra, at 363 (grounding advocacy of a more client-centered
approach in the public value of law as a necessary precursor to coordinated social action in
societies characterized by normative disagreement as to fundamental moral values). As such,
they might be considered possible alternatives to Simon's theory as a basis for developing a
theory of government attorney ethics. However, to the extent that their views place greater re-
sponsibilities on clients to make important decisions, Spaulding and Wendel's theories are more
likely than Simon's to fall prey to the previously-discussed client identification problems that
plague government attorney representation. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
Additionally, as of this date, Spaulding has not specifically addressed the applicability of his
views to government attorneys. Wendel has, at least to a certain degree, in discussions of the
ethics of the conduct of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) attorneys in conjunction with the
now infamous "torture memos" relating to permissible interrogation techniques for use on pris-
oners suspected of having information regarding potential terrorist activity. See W. Bradley
Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005); W. Bradley
Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals (Cornell Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 05-011, 2005), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=687804 [hereinafter Wendel,
Legal Ethics]. Wendel criticizes the OLC lawyers for treating laws regarding torture as barriers
to be circumvented, rather than the outcome of legitimate processes designed to facilitate coor-
dinated social action against a background of moral pluralism, and which were therefore entitled
to respect. Wendel, Legal Ethics, supra. However, Wendell's critique does not rely in particular
on the OLC lawyers' status as government attorneys, and indeed, it appears that Wendel would
present the same criticism had the OLC lawyers been private attorneys representing private
parties. See id. Wendel's analysis, therefore, does not appear to be compatible with the public-
interest-serving-role for government attorneys. Thus, at least for the time being, Simon's theory
of legal ethics remains the best basis for a theory of government attorney ethics.
'0' Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Rule of Law(yers), 65 Mo. L. REV. 571, 577 (2000) (criti-
cizing Simon's justice-based approach as indeterminate); see also Miller, supra note 26, at
1294-95 (claiming in discussing civil government attorney ethics that "there are as many ideas
of the 'public interest' as there are people who think about the subject"); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) (criticizing the prosecutor's duty to "do justice" as establishing "no iden-
tifiable norm").
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Simon's conception of the term justice equates generally to a concept
of legal merit, or the notion that even if application of relevant legal
rules to particular sets of circumstances does not yield clearly right or
wrong answers in all cases, it may nonetheless yield better or worse
answers to a degree that rebuts the indeterminacy critique. 10 2 Here,
Simon's views are consistent with both broadly accepted jurispruden-
tial theories and the intuitions of most practicing attorneys. 10 3 There-
fore, Simon's notion of legal merit stands up against his critics'
charges.
Turning more specifically to Simon's conception of legal merit:
determining the legal merit of a particular position in a controversy
requires determination of the purposes behind the legal rules to be
applied to the facts of the particular controversy.1' 4 Thus, to apply
Simon's maxim and the version of the public-interest-serving-role
that is based on it to the circumstances of Alighieri, it is necessary to
inquire into the purposes behind the legal rules implicated in the case.
As suggested earlier, the critical legal rule to consider in evaluating
the ethical appropriateness of the hard bargaining in Alighieri is the
$100,000 damage cap under the MTCA. But for the damage cap, it
would have been impossible for me to come up with such a firm "bot-
tom line" to insist upon in the course of settlement negotiations, or at
least one that was so low in relation to what the value of the case
would have been absent the cap. Thus, an evaluation of my conduct in
terms of the public-interest-serving-role requires an examination of
the purposes behind damage caps under government tort claims acts.
Damage caps under government tort claims acts must be analyzed
against the backdrop of the sovereign immunity doctrine. With an-
105
cient origins, the sovereign immunity doctrine, often described
loosely by the phrase "the king can do no wrong,"' barred lawsuits
against the sovereign at English common law.1° Despite America's
102 SIMON, THE PRACTICE, supra note 97, at 9-11.
103 Id.
1041d. at 144-45. Indeed, Simon's focus on the purposes behind laws has led a number of
scholars to describe his approach as "purposivist." E.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Apparently Substan-
tial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of Justice, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1472, 1477 (1999);
Spaulding, supra note 100, at 83; Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 9, 24 (1995).
105 Jamie McAlister, The New Mexico Tort Claims Act: The King Can Do "Little" Wrong,
21 N.M. L. REV. 441,441-42 (1991).
106J. James Frasier III, A Review of Issues Presented by § 11-46-11 of the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act: The Notice Provisions and Statute of Limitations, 65 Miss. L.J. 643, 643 (1996);
McAlister, supra note 105, at 441; Mary S. Hack, Note, Sovereign Immunity and Public Entities
in Missouri: Clarifying the Status of Hybrid Entities, 58 Mo. L. REV. 743, 746 (1993); Mark L.
Van Valkenburgh, Note, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258, § J0: Slouching Toward
Sovereign Immunity, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1995).
107 Frasier, supra note 106, at 644; McAlister, supra note 105, at 441; Van Valkenbugh,
2005]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
origins in rebellion against the notion of monarchical authority, the
sovereign immunity doctrine was incorporated early on into Ameri-
can law at both the federal and state levels. 0 8 Over time, however, the
unfairness of prohibiting all claims against the government for redress
for improper conduct became obvious, and courts and legislatures
began carving out exceptions to the background rule of immunity. 1°9
Tort claims acts of the type at issue here are a major example of one
such exception. Nonetheless, many of the state tort claims acts en-
acted have caps on damages similar to the one contained in the
MTCA. °
The purposes behind the damage caps contained in most state tort
claims act are not hard to discern. On the one hand, damage caps
serve to preserve the public fisc and ensure that adequate funds
remain available for the numerous and multifarious purposes citizens
expect modern governments to serve."' On the other hand, the
amount of damages available under state tort claims acts is viewed as
being adequate to provide fair compensation to those injured by the
negligent conduct of state actors. 1 2 Such damage caps uniformly
have withstood constitutional challenges on grounds of state equal
protection, 13 due process," 4 and access to courts clauses" t5 because
the purposes described above represent legitimate government
objectives.
Returning to an analysis of the settlement posture employed in
Alighieri, the two purposes behind damage caps point to opposite
conclusions. The "protect the public fisc" purpose behind damage
caps supports attorney conduct that would yield the lowest possible
recovery for a state tort claim plaintiff. However, to the extent that the
amount of the damage cap is intended to provide a fair measure of
recovery to claimants against the state, even when the actual amount
of damages sustained greatly exceeds the amount of the cap, it seems
that the full amount of the cap should be paid in all instances when
the expected amount of the recovery would be greater than the
amount of the cap, but for the cap. Moreover, the $100,000 cap of-
supra note 106, at 1081.
108 Frasier, supra note 106, at 644-45; McAlister, supra note 105, at 442; Hack, supra note
106, at 746-47; Van Valkenburgh, supra note 106, at 1081.
109 Frasier, supra note 106, at 645; Van Valkenburgh, supra note 106, at 1082.
0 See 1 CIvIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 6.12 (2002) [here-
inafter, CIVIL ACTIONS].
I Hallett v. Town of Wrenthem, 499 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Mass. 1986); accord CIVIL AC-
TIONS, supra note 110, § 6.13 (citing cases).
12 Hallett, 499 N.E.2d. at 1194; CIvIL ACTIONS, supra note 110, § 6.13 (citing cases).
13 CIVIL ACTIONS, supra note I 10, § 6.13 (citing cases).
114 Id.
1 "5
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fered under the Massachusetts statute is not among the more generous
caps.' 16 Given that in Alighieri a judgment in the plaintiffs' favor was
highly likely and that the actual amount of damages to be determined
by the jury would likely exceed the cap, it seems that the best ac-
commodation of the competing policies would be to pay the full
amount allowable.
V. SHOULD THE PUBLIC-INTEREST-SERVING-ROLE
APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE?
It was concluded above that under both the positive law enacted
pursuant to the public-interest-serving-role for government attorneys
and the broader theory underlying that role, the settlement posture in
Alighieri might well have been inappropriate. But before concluding
the analysis entirely, it is worth asking whether the public-interest-
serving-role should be applied in all instances when evaluating the
ethics of government attorney conduct. One of the key bases for the
public-interest-serving-role is the fact that the government entity rep-
resented by the government attorney exercises sovereign authority.
1 7
As such, it has unique responsibilities to pursue the public interest.1 8
The government attorney's duty to pursue the public interest is, at
least in part, derivative of the represented entity's duty.'n 9 Moreover,
given that government attorneys are themselves government officials,
they have an independent duty to pursue the public interest as well.
20
In any event, it is not clear that all government action involves an
exercise of sovereignty. Thus, the question arises whether the public-
interest-serving-role should apply to situations in which the govern-
ment entity does not obviously exercise its sovereignty, such as when
the government attorney represents a government entity in negotiating
and drafting a contract or when he or she represents a government
entity in a "routine" tort case. Moreover, even if some representations
fall outside the purview of the public-interest-serving-role, it must be
determined whether Alighieri involved one such representation.
116 Damage caps under state tort claims acts appear to run from $100,000 at the low end, to
$750,000 at the high end. See, e.g., CiviL ACTIONS, supra note 110, § 6.12 (collecting tort
claims statutes from various states). The Federal Tort Claims Act does not include a damage
cap. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000).
17 E.g., Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers "Seek Justice" in Civil Litigation?, 9
WIDENER J. PuB. L. 235, 277 (2000).
1181d. at 270-71.
"91d. at 269.
1
20 Id. at 275; Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 20, at 818-21.
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A. Should There Be Exceptions to the Public-Interest-Serving-Role?
There are a number of areas of substantive law that, at least at first
glance, appear to support the view that the government may in some
instances "shed" its sovereignty and be treated similarly to nongov-
ernment parties when it acts without exercising its sovereignty. These
doctrines seem to support the view that there should be an exception
to the public-interest-serving-role for government attorneys when
such attorneys represent government entities acting outside of their
sovereign capacity. Three such doctrines discussed here are (1) the
"market participant" doctrine under the dormant commerce clause, (2)
the "government as speaker" doctrine within First Amendment law,
and (3) the "government as employer" cases following Pickering v.
Board of Education. ' 21 However, on further analysis, I argue that each
of these doctrines either rests on a weak foundation or is of limited
practical significance, and that even to the extent that such doctrines
remain viable, none goes so far as to equate completely government
entities with similarly situated nongovernmental entities. Therefore,
none of these doctrines supports the idea of a blanket exception to the
public-interest-serving-role, even when the represented government
entity appears to act outside of its sovereign capacity.
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce. 22 Under the "dormant commerce clause doc-
trine," the U.S. Supreme Court has held that by negative implication,
the Commerce Clause additionally prohibits states from enacting
"legislation that discriminates against or impermissibly burdens inter-
state commerce." 123 However, in a series of cases beginning with
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,124 the Court carved out an excep-
tion to the prohibitions of the dormant commerce clause doctrine for
situations where a state acts as a "market participant" rather than as a
"market regulator. 1 25 For example, in Hughes, the Court held that
Maryland laws favoring in-state sellers of abandoned automobiles
were permissible because the state was participating in the market
121391 U.S. 563 (1968).
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 3.
123 Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV Cannot Re-
place the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REv. 384, 385 n.2 (2003); see also
Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J.
559, 564-65 (1990) (discussing how courts have held the dormant commerce clause prohibits
state regulation that either discourages or unduly burdens interstate commerce).
124426 U.S. 794 (1976).
125 Denning, supra note 123, at 396 (citing White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employees,
460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980); Hughes, 426
U.S. at 809-10 (1976)).
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rather than regulating it.126 In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,'27 the Court up-
held a regulation giving state residents preference over nonresidents
in the purchase of cement from a state-owned plant on the same
grounds. And, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employees,1 28 the Court also upheld under the market participant doc-
trine a municipal ordinance that required contractors and subcontrac-
tors with the city of Boston to hire a certain number of city residents.
In each of these cases, the state engaged in commercial rather than
sovereign activity, thus warranting an exception from the strictures
that apply to it in the latter capacity.
As the Commerce Clause limits state governments' ability to affect
interstate commerce, the First Amendment similarly imposes great
restrictions on governments' ability to regulate speech. 2 9 For exam-
ple, the government generally may not suppress private speech based
on the content of the speech.1 30 And when the government creates a
public forum for speech, it may not discriminate in providing access
to that forum based on the viewpoint expressed by the speaker.
31
However, an emerging doctrine seems to recognize that when the
government itself acts as a speaker, as opposed to a regulator of
speech, such restrictions do not necessarily apply. 1
32
Perhaps the best-known case relating to this doctrine is Rust v. Sul-
livan.' 33 Rust involved a challenge to the constitutionality of regula-
tions that: (a) prohibited projects funded pursuant to Title X of the
Public Health Service Act (the "Act") from giving counseling and
referrals to women regarding abortion or advocating abortion as a
method of family planning and (b) required funded projects to use
separate facilities, personnel, and accounting records from any abor-
tion-related entities.1 34 The Act specified that none of the funds allo-
cated pursuant to Title X "be used in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning."' 135 The Court rejected arguments that the
126 Hughes, 426 U.S. at 809-10.
27 Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 446-47.
128 White, 460 U.S. at 214-15.
129 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
130 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining that content-
based regulations are "presumptively invalid").
131 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94
(1993) (holding that a school district cannot deny access to a public forum because the proposed
presentation is from a religious perspective); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69 (1981)
(holding that a university cannot discriminate against religious speech in a public forum).
132 See, e.g., Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Govern-
ment Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411 (2004) (examining the underpinnings and
possible implications of a government speech doctrine).
133500 U.S. 173 (1991).
14d. at 179-80.
135 Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2005)).
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regulations impermissibly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint-
favoring an anti-abortion message over competing views. 136 The
Court held that the government may permissibly fund certain activi-
ties as opposed to others, even if such funding choices involve value
judgments regarding issues of great public controversy. 37 The Court
went on to note that the government may additionally take steps to
ensure that the allocated funds be used only for their intended pur-
poses.138 Thus, the government's decision to fund family planning
programs relating to conception and childbirth, as opposed to abor-
tion, and the steps it took to ensure that none of those funds were used
in support of abortion or related services were both permissible exer-
cises of governmental authority rather than impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.
A third area in which the government appears to be able to avoid
many of the restrictions that apply to its actions as sovereign occurs
when the government acts as an employer. The case most closely as-
sociated with this doctrine is Pickering v. Board of Education.J39 In
Pickering, a public school teacher was fired for writing a letter to a
newspaper editor criticizing the actions of the local board of educa-
tion in relation to two bond issue proposals and the allocation of re-
sources between the school system's athletic and educational needs.' 40
The board contended that the letter contained numerous false state-
ments, impugned the integrity of members of the board, and would
foment controversy and discontent among teachers.' 4' Mr. Pickering
countered that because the letter related to the actions of public offi-
cials and matters of public concern, the heightened standard of proof
required to show defamation under the Court's decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 42 should be applied to review of the statements
contained in his letter as well. 143 The board, on the other hand, argued
that an employer's need for loyalty from its employees, as well as the
school system's educational needs, called for a higher standard of
veracity and accuracy in evaluating public speech by teachers.44
1361d. at 192-93.
137 Id.
1381d. at 193-94.
139391 U.S. 563 (1968).
140 Id. at 564-65.
141 Id. at 566-67.
142 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (requiring proof of knowledge that a statement was false or
made with reckless disregard of whether it was false, to allow recovery).
143 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
144 Id. at 568-69.
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In holding that Mr. Pickering's dismissal was improper,' 45 the
Court refused to adopt the extremes of either side's legal arguments.
Rather, the Court opted for a middle ground, balancing a government
employer's interest in efficiency and orderly administration with a
government employee's First Amendment interest in freedom of
speech regarding matters of public concern. 146 Over time, the Court's
Pickering "balancing test" has been refined into a three-part inquiry
where the government employer alleges that government employee
speech will "disrupt" the workplace. 47 What is important for present
purposes is.the fact that this doctrine grants the government much
greater authority to regulate speech in its capacity as employer than it
has in its capacity as regulator of speech, and that this distinction is
based on the government exercising its sovereignty in the latter ca-
pacity but not in the former.
48
The three doctrines discussed above seem to support the notion
that the government may, in some circumstances, "shed" its
sovereignty and be governed by standards significantly less stringent
than those that apply to the government when it acts in its sovereign
capacity. Correspondingly, one view of these doctrines suggests that
if the government acts outside of its sovereign capacity, government
attorneys need not be held to the standards of the public-interest-
serving-role but should adhere to the same ethical standards as private
attorneys. A closer examination of the three doctrines, however,
demonstrates that such a conclusion is not justified.
First, the market participant doctrine is of significantly less ongo-
ing import than the above-cited cases might suggest. 149 Even in situa-
tions where state or local regulation might be insulated from chal-
lenge under the dormant commerce clause by the market participant
doctrine, such regulation might nonetheless run afoul of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV. 150 For example, in United Build-
145 Id. at 574-75.
146 Id. at 569-70.
47 See Ailsa W. Chang, Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Freedom:
A Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 926 (2001)
(explaining that a government employee may be fired for speech that will disrupt the govern-
ment employer's workplace if: "(1) the employer's prediction of disruption is reasonable, (2) the
potential disruptiveness is enough to outweigh the value of the speech, and (3) the employer
took action against the employee based on this potential disruption and not in retaliation for the
speech").
148 See id. at 927 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994)) (suggesting that
the different goals of employees and governments yield differences in the kind of acceptable
restrictions).
149 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
150 U.S. Const. art. IV; see Manheim, supra note 123, at 617 & n.426 (citing cases involv-
ing challenges to both clauses).
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ing & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,'5 1 plaintiffs
challenged a municipal ordinance requiring a certain percentage of
jobs on construction projects performed on behalf of the city of Cam-
den to be filled by city residents that was substantially similar to the
ordinance held to be immune from dormant commerce clause chal-
lenge under the market participant doctrine in White.152 However, the
Court declined to apply the dormant commerce clause's market par-
ticipant exception to plaintiffs' Privileges and Immunities Clause
claim. 53 Thus, the mayor, on remand, was required to demonstrate
"substantial reasons" for the hiring requirement's discrimination
against out-of-state residents and prove that the provision was closely
related to those reasons. 5 4 Of course, under this standard, many of the
"local hire" provisions that are insulated from review pursuant to the
dormant commerce clause are nonetheless likely to be stuck down
pursuant to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 155
Additionally, a number of commentators have questioned the on-
going viability of the market participant doctrine following the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.' 56 In Garcia, the Court overruled its earlier deci-
sion in National League of Cities v. Usery,'57 in which it held that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in applying the fed-
eral minimum wage law to state and local governments.158 The Usery
decision rested, at least in part, on a distinction between the sovereign
and proprietary functions of state government.159 Historically, the
Court had viewed a state's sovereign functions as immune from fed-
151 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
152 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (describing the ordinance in White); see also
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. at 213 (explaining that the plaintiffs dropped their dormant com-
merce clause claim because of the result in White).
153 Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. at 219-20. The Court drew this distinction based on what it
described as the different purposes behind the two constitutional provisions. Id. at 220. The
Court reasoned that the dormant commerce clause doctrine was developed to protect the Com-
merce Clause's delegation to the U.S. Congress of the authority to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. And, as suggested above, where state governments act as market participants, rather than
regulators, the dormant commerce clause's purpose of banning conflicting regulation is not
implicated. Id. By contrast, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed to restrict ac-
tions by states that might threaten interstate harmony. Id. Because state actions might threaten
such disharmony whether they take the form of regulation or market participation, it would not
make sense to except market participation from the Clause's coverage. Id.
54Id. at 222-23.
155 See Manheim, supra note 123, at 618-23 (examining possible explanations for the rela-
tive effectiveness of the two clauses).
156469 U.S. 528 (1985).
157426 U.S. 833 (1976).
1S Id. at 852.
159 Manheim, supra note 123, at 574 (explaining that Usery signaled the reemergence of
this distinction).
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eral government regulation, whereas a state's proprietary functions
could be regulated within the Constitution's federalism framework.'60
The Usery Court concluded that setting the terms and conditions of
employment with its employees went to the heart of states' govern-
mental functions, rather than merely involving states in their proprie-
tary capacity.16 1 In Garcia, however, the Court rejected the sover-
eign/proprietary function distinction as unworkable 62 and abandoned
it as a basis for limiting Congressional authority to regulate the wages
and hours of state and municipal employees. 
63
The logical similarities between the sovereign/proprietary function
distinction rejected in Garcia, and the regulator/market participant
distinction recognized in Hughes and its progeny' 64 should be readily
apparent. Indeed, these similarities have caused a number of commen-
tators to conclude that in addition to overruling Usury, at least implic-
itly, Garcia overruled the market participant doctrine. 165 On the other
hand, at least a couple of commentators have argued in favor of the
market participant doctrine's continuing vitality. 66 Perhaps most tell-
ingly, the Supreme Court has not explicitly relied on the market par-
ticipant doctrine to decide a case in the two decades since Garcia.1
67
Whether the market participant exception clings to life or not, for the
foregoing reasons it remains too weak a reed on which to ground the
notion that there should be exceptions to the public-interest-serving-
role for government attorneys in certain circumstances.
The government-as-speaker notion recognized by the Court in Rust
also fails to provide adequate support for recognizing exceptions to
the public-interest-serving-role for government attorneys. First, Rust
has been "widely and severely criticized by Constitutional scholars"
on a variety of grounds. 168 Second, it is worth mentioning that no-
where in the Rust opinion itself does the Court explicitly rely on the
government-as-speaker concept to uphold the regulations at issue.169
16lId. at 570-74 (summarizing the history of the sovereign proprietary doctrine).
161 Usury, 426 U.S. at 851.
162 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1985).
163 See id. at 545-55 (choosing instead to defer to the political process).
164 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
165 Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception
to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 727, 733-34 nn.52-55 (citing numerous
authorities).
66Id. at 733 n.53.
'
67 See id. at 733 & n.51 (noting that the Supreme Court has been essentially quiet on the
market participation doctrine since Garcia).
'68 Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1391 & n.44 (citing articles) (2001). But see id. at 1391 n.45 (summarizing
the less popular pro-Rust view).
'
6 9 See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning of the Rust
court).
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Only in subsequent cases has the Court raised the point that the gov-
ernment's attempt to communicate was a significant factor in the Rust
decision.1
70
The metaphor that a government is "speaking"' 71 would seem
stronger in a context involving more direct speech, such as a govern-
ment official giving a speech or a government published brochure
advocating a certain position, than a context in which the government
"speaks" by funding private parties to engage in certain activities and
then enacting regulations restricting the scope of those activities as
was the case in Rust. Indeed, it may be difficult to distinguish Rust
from cases in which the government subsidizes artistic expression
rather than speaking itself. 72 And, while it is true that when the gov-
ernment acts as subsidizer of expression, it has broad authority in de-
termining how to spend public funds, that authority is not wholly free
from First Amendment restrictions. 1
73
Therefore, Rust at best provides a shaky foundation for a doctrine
recognizing that when the government acts as speaker, the traditional
First Amendment constraints that apply to it in its role as sovereign or
as regulator of speech should be relaxed. Moreover, to the extent such
a doctrine is emerging, much work remains to be done in establishing
the contours and implications of such a doctrine. 174 In defining such a
doctrine, it would be a mistake to go so far as to treat all government
speech exactly the same as private speech for First Amendment pur-
poses. The very concept of government speech is in tension with both
the text and the purposes behind the First Amendment; the risk of
government speech distorting the private speech marketplaces the
Amendment was designed to encourage is too great to ignore. 75
Therefore, even a doctrine recognizing limited First Amendment re-
170 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-41 (2001) (citing Bd. of Re-
gents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
171 See generally Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004) (dis-
cussing the persuasive power of metaphors).
172 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 168, at 1457-62 (comparing Rust with National En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), in which the Court upheld a statute requir-
ing consideration of standards of "decency" in determining awards of grants from the National
Endowment for the Arts).
173 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1983) (uphold-
ing internal revenue statutes that denied tax exemptions to certain charities engaged in lobbying
but that allowed such exemptions to veterans groups that engaged in lobbying) (cited with ap-
proval in Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991)).
174 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 168, at 1382-83.
175See id. at 1508-11 (warning that protecting government speech may cause competition
with the First Amendment rights of individuals); see also Linda L. Berger, Note, Government-
Owned Media: The Government as Speaker and Censor, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 720-21
(1985).
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strictions on government speech would not go so far as to completely
support the notion of the government "shedding" its sovereignty, nor
the notion that there should be exceptions to the public-interest-
serving-role for government attorneys in certain circumstances.
The holding in Pickering also fails to compel the conclusion that
there should be exceptions to the public-interest-serving-role for gov-
ernment attorneys. It is true that under the Pickering doctrine, when
the government acts as an employer, it faces significantly lower re-
strictions on its ability to sanction employees for speech acts than it
does in its sovereign capacity as regulator of private speech. 176 How-
ever, the very existence of the Pickering balancing test demonstrates a
difference between the constraints on government and private em-
ployers in responding to employee speech. For even the lower con-
straints that Pickering imposes on government employers protects
employee speech to a greater extent than the employment-at-will doc-
trine governing private employers. 77 In any event, at most, Pickering
supports the notion that while the government may shed some of its
sovereignty when acting in its capacity as employer, it does not shed
itself of either its sovereignty entirely or the restrictions that accom-
pany such sovereignty. Correspondingly, while Pickering might sup-
port the notion of relaxing the requirements of the public-interest-
serving-role for government attorneys in certain circumstances, it
does not support a conclusion that those requirements should be
eliminated entirely in certain circumstances.
It should be pointed out here that even in the paradigmatic in-
stances mentioned above, when the government appears to act no dif-
ferent from a private party (i.e., contracting for the purchase of goods
or defending against a garden variety tort suit), the law in fact does
not treat the government exactly the same as it would a private party.
For example, with regard to the purchase of goods or services by gov-
ernment entities, there are often a wide range of procurement statutes
in place that significantly restrict the government's ability to contract
in ways that would not apply to private parties. 78 Similarly, in the tort
context, the very existence of tort claims acts like the MTCA demon-
strate the different requirements that apply in tort litigation with the
176 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Pickering test).
177 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the
First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 342-
48 (1994) (discussing the reluctance of courts to protect employees' freedom of speech from
employers); 2 EMP. L. DESKBOOK HUM. RESOURCES PROF. § 34.5 n. 13 (2005). An exception
may exist in "whistleblower" type situations when an employee is fired for speech that reveals
conditions that threaten public health or safety. Id. § 34.5 n. 14.
178 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-266a (2000) (attempting to eliminate policies and practices
that unnecessarily inhibit open competition with the government).
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government as opposed to private parties. In short, there is simply
inadequate support for the notion that there are contexts in which the
government may so completely shed its sovereignty as to justify a
complete departure from the public-interest-serving-role for the gov-
ernment attorneys who provide legal representation to those govern-
ment entities.
B. Would an Exception to the Public-Interest-Serving-Role
Apply Here?
Even if we were to reach the conclusion that there are certain cir-
cumstances in which the government so clearly acts outside of its
sovereign capacity that it would be appropriate to excuse attorneys
representing the government in such circumstances from the require-
ments of the public-interest-serving-role, it is far from clear that
Alighieri would present an example of such circumstances. This case
does not present such a circumstance because delivery of mental
health services of the type at issue here was traditionally considered a
governmental responsibility, thereby implicating state sovereignty. It
is true that in recent decades, mental health services have been among
the vast array of services previously performed by government enti-
ties that have been "privatized."'' 79 Despite this fact, as pointed out
earlier, the current regime for the delivery of mental health services
includes delivery of services by both governmental and private enti-
ties, as well as a wide range of public and private "partnerships" of
varying types. 80. Therefore, it is simply not accurate to say that the
government has shed itself entirely of its traditional sovereign func-
tion of caring for the mentally infirmed. Moreover, as a matter of
general law, courts have been loathe to exempt governments from the
restrictions that apply to them in their sovereign capacities, even
when the government is engaged in functions that have been partially
or even largely privatized.18! Therefore, even if we were willing to
recognize certain circumstances when the government acts outside of
179 See William Brooks, The Privatization of the Civil Commitment Process and the State
Action Doctrine: Have the Mentally IIl Been Systematically Stripped of Their Fourteenth
Amendment Rights?, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002); John Petrila, Redefining Mental Health Law:
Thoughts on a New Agenda, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 91 (1992); Lynn S. Simons, Privati-
zation and the Mental Health System, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1138 (1989).
180 See Petrila, supra note 179, at 91 (describing the emerging balance of governmental and
private roles in providing services to the mentally ill). See generally MARTHA MINOW, PART-
NERS, NOT RiVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002) (discussing the vast array of
public/private partnerships across a range of services).
181 By contrast, courts have hesitated to apply the restrictions that apply to sovereign gov-
ernment entities to private parties, even when such parties perform "privatized" government
functions or act pursuant to government contracts. See MINOW, supra note 180, at 31-32;
Brooks, supra note 179, at 3.
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its sovereign capacity, and therefore excuse lawyers representing the
government in such a capacity from the strictures of the public-
interest-serving-role, it is unlikely that representing the government in
conjunction with the delivery of mental health services would be one
such circumstance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although my hard bargaining on behalf of the government tortfea-
sor in Alighieri would not have been unethical had it been engaged in
by a lawyer on behalf of a private client, a different conclusion is
warranted because the actions were undertaken by a government at-
torney. First, under the heightened threshold for defending a claim
applicable to government attorneys, it was inappropriate to litigate
Alighieri based on a willingness to go to trial, when the merits of the
claim were such that the plaintiffs would almost certainly, and indeed
should almost certainly, have prevailed had the case gone to trial.
Second, given the purposes behind damage caps in state tort claims
acts such as the MTCA, it was also inappropriate to use the existence
of the cap to squeeze a few thousand dollars from the plaintiffs' re-
covery based on the inherent uncertainties and costs of going to trial,
particularly given that under the aforementioned heightened pleading
threshold, such a trial should never have happened at all in the par-
ticular case. Thus, my hard bargaining in Alighieri ran afoul of gov-
ernment lawyers' public-interest-serving-role.
Moreover, the circumstances of Alighieri fail to support either a
general or a particular exception to the public-interest-serving-role
when the represented governmental actor engages in conduct that is
similar to that which a private party might engage in. It is simply er-
roneous to contend that the government somehow sheds its sover-
eignty when it engages in conduct that could equally be engaged in by
a private party. No matter what type of activity it engages in, the gov-
ernment retains its obligations to pursue the public interest and to
treat all of its constituents fairly; obligations that do not similarly at-
tach to private actors. Additionally, individual government employ-
ees, both lawyers and their clients, retain independent obligations to
serve these goals by virtue of their status. Finally, government entities
retain resource advantages over private ones in terms of finances,
reputation, and authority that continue to require special restrictions
on governmental action implicating such advantages. For all of these
reasons, no blanket exception to the public-interest-serving-role for
government attorneys should be recognized regardless of the type of
activity the represented government entity engages in. Also, because
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treatment of the mentally infirmed was traditionally considered an
obligation that followed from governmental sovereignty, the underly-
ing case presents a particularly weak claim for such an exception.
Of course, nearly a decade and a half later, after the heat of litiga-
tion has cooled and the sharpened lens of hindsight has heightened
my analytic powers, it is relatively easy (and cost free) to conclude
that I should have acted differently in Alighieri. Nonetheless, I am left
with the strong feeling that the proper course of conduct at the time
would have been to advocate to my superiors in the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office for payment of the full $100,000 allowable under the
damage cap to the plaintiffs in settlement of the case. Mea culpa.
